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Cross-country econometrics has been the preferred tool of empirical growth analysis over the past 20 years. 
Th   is literature has tended to focus the analysis on long time periods, ignoring the instability and volatility of 
growth patterns in developing countries. Because shocks play a central role in explaining variations in growth 
patterns in the developing world (Easterly and others, 1993), the meaning of the statistical coeﬃ   cient esti-
mated for long periods of time is unclear. In this sense, the use of panel data econometrics for shorter periods 
may be more appropriate, although, for many reasons, not ideal (Pritchett, 2000). Another route is to ex-
amine factors that determine growth spurts (accelerations) and collapses. Country-speciﬁ  c historical analysis 
is a third route (see, for example, Rodrik, 2003, among others), but the comparability of such analyses is a 
signiﬁ  cant limitation in this regard.
Th   is paper takes the second route, focusing on growth surges and collapses in developing countries 
and their relation to common external factors that aﬀ  ect the economic performance of these countries. It also 
looks at the role of patterns of specialization in explaining relative growth performance in recent decades. 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst section presents a survey of the still limited empirical literature on growth spurts and collapses. Th  e 
second section looks at the incidence of accelerations and collapses of growth in developing countries since 
1950 and identiﬁ  es a “global development cycle” that circumscribes developing economies’ growth possi-
bilities. Th   e third focuses on the role in this context of specialization patterns and production development 
strategies. Th   e fourth presents some conclusions. Some of the facts that are mentioned are well known, yet, 
curiously enough, have been generally disregarded in the growth literature.
Survey of literature on growth spurts and collapses
In one of the best known studies on economic growth instability in the developing world Easterly and others 
(1993) show that a large part of the variance of growth rates of developing countries, even in periods as long 
as a decade, can be directly explained by shocks: in the terms of trade, in debt crises and sharp changes in 
net external transfers, and in the form of wars. Furthermore, shocks have an indirect inﬂ  uence on growth 
by inducing policy changes. In turn, Easterly (2001) underscores the greater vulnerability of poor countries 
to natural disasters, compared to middle- and high-income countries. Th   e greater sensitivity of low-income 
countries—particularly Sub-Saharan African countries—to these problems, as well as to civil wars, explains 
the greater dispersion of growth rates among them.
Looking at discontinuities in the growth experience is important for several reasons. First, the hy-
pothetical determinants of economic growth may have non-linear eﬀ  ects, which imply that the same policy 
may have diﬀ  erent eﬀ  ects in diﬀ  erent countries and time periods. Non-linear interactions as well as (positive 
or negative) feedbacks are involved, for example, in the interaction between human capital and economic 
1 Th   e authors are very grateful to Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Stephany Griﬃ   th-Jones, Daniel Heymann, Jorge Katz, 
Jomo Kwame Sundaram, Rafael Lopez Monti, José Luis Machinea, Stefania Piﬀ  anelli, Jaime Ros, Verónica Silva 
and Lance Taylor for their comments and suggestions, as well as to participants in the Seminar held at ECLAC on 
September 1-2, 2005. Th   e usual disclaimers apply.2  DESA Working Paper No. 24
development (Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez, 2000).2 As a result of non-linearities and the inconclusiveness of 
existing econometric results,3 it may be impossible to draw policy implications from cross-country econo-
metrics (Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Easterly, 2005; Rodríguez, 2006; Rodrik, 2005).
Th   e second reason is that in economies experiencing substantial shocks, it may be impossible to 
isolate long-term trends from observable short-term trajectories. Th   e major explanation for this is the path 
dependence generated by dynamic economies of scale: the close association between technological learning 
and production experience (i.e. “learning by doing” in a broad sense), as well as similar processes related to 
the development of marketing networks and the growth of ﬁ  rms’ reputation (goodwill). Th   is means that 
both negative shocks (an external crisis, a natural disaster, or a war) and positive shocks (the discovery of new 
natural resources) may have long-term implications.4 A related issue is that the formation of expectations in 
economies facing recurrent shocks necessarily involves a learning process (Heymann, 2000).
Th   e origins of shocks are obviously important in this regard. Given the emphasis of the existing 
growth literature on the domestic factors that determine the growth performance of developing countries, the 
role of external shocks aﬀ  ecting performance generally has been downplayed or even ignored in cross-country 
econometrics. In contrast, external factors have been the focus of the structuralist tradition, with its emphasis 
on the asymmetries that characterize the functioning of the world economy (Ocampo and Martin, 2003). 
As we will see, the role of external factors is critical, for major breaks in the growth process in the developing 
world tend to cluster around speciﬁ  c time periods, indicating that developing countries’ economies tend to 
follow a common cycle, with major breaks clearly associated with the world economy.
Th   e third reason why discontinuities are important is institutional in character. Although all forms 
of institution-building follow an evolutionary process, this feature is particularly important in State institu-
tion-building, again due to the “learning” processes involved. An interruption in the process of State build-
ing caused by a major economic crisis may thus have long-term implications, as a cursory look at the prob-
lems of Latin America following the “lost decade” indicates. Th   e mix of an economic crisis with civil conﬂ  ict 
may be particularly problematic, as the experience of several Sub-Saharan African countries over the past 
quarter century shows. In turn, major political discontinuities, such as revolutions (capitalist as well as social-
ist) can unleash an institutional restructuring that takes time to mature and may have unexpected twists. Th  e 
experience of Central and Eastern Europe is the most relevant recent story in this regard. A major implica-
tion of this analysis is that, even if a major structural reform eventually has positive long-term eﬀ  ects, it also 
has transitional costs that may swamp its favourable impacts for a long time. In terms of the debates of the 
1980s, this implies that “big bangs” are much less attractive than was believed during the period of structural 
reforms. Nonetheless, the discussion below will concentrate on economic issues, largely leaving aside these 
institutional dimensions. 
Finally, in terms of the evolution of economic structures, long-term growth should be understood as 
the result of sequential sector-speciﬁ  c growth spurts, of their intensity and of the domestic linkages that they 
2  See the analysis of the variable eﬀ  ects of education in diﬀ  erent countries and time periods in Azariadis and Drazen 
(1990).
3  Indeed, the voluminous literature on cross-country econometrics has identiﬁ  ed nearly 150 variables that have 
statistically signiﬁ  cant eﬀ  ects on growth (Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2005). Because these variables do not 
necessarily exclude each other, with that technique alone it is impossible to know what priority should be given to each 
one of them (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
4  See, for instance, Easterly (2001: ch. 10), or the analysis of “Dutch disease” by Krugman (1990: ch. 7), and van 
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generate. Th   e noticeable discontinuities that characterize the evolution of production structures and special-
ization patterns imply that these factors may be crucial to understanding growth dynamics. Cross-country 
econometrics has failed to give adequate attention to this issue, emphasized in the structuralist tradition (see, 
for example, Amsden, 2001; Lall, 2001; Palma, 2004). Th   e Kaldorian links running from growth to produc-
tivity, associated with the presence of underutilized resources during the growth process, have also been dis-
regarded, as well as the links between productivity convergence, domestic production linkages and external 
balances (Ocampo, 2005a; Rada and Taylor, 2004; Cimoli and Correa, 2005).
Several attempts have been made in recent years to understand the role of discontinuities in the 
growth process. Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) explore the determinants of episodes of economic 
growth acceleration since the 1950s. According to their results, accelerations are associated with increases in 
investment and trade, as well as with real exchange rate depreciation. Accelerations also appear to be linked 
to changes in political regimes. Positive terms of trade shocks have positive short-term eﬀ  ects, but they are 
not a signiﬁ  cant predictor of sustained accelerations. On the contrary, standard economic reform measures 
play no role in explaining growth accelerations, although they can help to explain whether or not growth 
is sustained. Th   e major conclusion of that paper, however, is that most of the variables used in mainstream 
growth analyses do not seem to play an important role as determinants of growth spurts and, in this sense, 
growth spurts are highly unpredictable.
Ros (2005), in contrast, considers the factors determining growth collapses. He ﬁ  nds three factors 
that aﬀ  ect the incidence of such episodes. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is size: small economies are more likely to face collapses. 
Th   e second is the pattern of specialization: dependence on raw material exports—particularly mineral ex-
ports—is associated with the incidence of reductions in per capita income. Th   e third is income distribution: 
more unequal societies are likely to face growth collapses. According to Ros, political-economy issues are 
involved in the latter two links, whereas vulnerability to shocks clearly shows in the ﬁ  rst two.
Reddy and Minoui (2005) examine a similar phenomenon: namely, real-income stagnation, which 
they deﬁ  ne as negligible or negative per capita real-income growth for a signiﬁ  cant uninterrupted sequence 
of years. Th  ey  ﬁ  nd that countries that suﬀ  ered spells of real income stagnation were more likely to be poor, 
dependent on primary commodity exports, conﬂ  ict ridden, and located in Latin America or Sub-Saharan 
Africa. A majority of landlocked developing countries also tend to be more likely to face long-term stagna-
tion. Stagnation is also very likely to persist over time: countries aﬄ   icted with stagnation in the 1960s had a 
75 per cent likelihood of being aﬄ   icted by stagnation in the 1990s as well. 
Jones and Olken (2005) claim that changes in physical capital accumulation are not important in 
explaining growth accelerations and that, at best, they explain only a quarter of the magnitude of growth 
collapses. Both events instead reﬂ  ect changes in productivity. Structural breaks are also associated with accel-
erations or decelerations in the allocation of labour to manufacturing, particularly to advanced manufactur-
ing. Upturns are associated, in turn, with the evolution of trade shares, whereas inﬂ  ation plays some role in 
downturns. Th   e authors ﬁ  nd that changes in productivity are the major determinant of both growth accel-
erations and collapses, but they fail to explain what determines major productivity shifts.
“Explaining” diﬀ  erences in growth rates as the result of diﬀ  erences in productivity growth, as do 
Jones and Olken (2005) and a voluminous literature, is however questionable, on at least two grounds. 
First, it ignores the short-term and perhaps even the medium-term Keynesian eﬀ  ects of changes in capacity 4  DESA Working Paper No. 24
utilization on productivity, which will bias analysis against the eﬀ  ects of capital accumulation.5 Second, it 
ignores long-term Kaldorian growth-productivity dynamics, according to which strong positive and negative 
productivity trends are associated with the more or less intensive utilization of existing factors of production: 
variable underemployment of physical capital and of the labour force, including human capital; and variable 
underutilization of natural resources; and existing infrastructure. Th   ese Kaldorian links, recently brought 
back to the debate by Ocampo (2005a), Rada (2005) and Rada and Taylor (2004) imply that productivity 
improvements are largely the result of economic growth rather than an exogenous determinant of growth (as 
in the neoclassical development literature). More generally, to the extent that these Kaldorian links are valid, 
growth and productivity must be explained simultaneously. 
The global development cycle
Th   e widening income gap between diﬀ  erent regions and countries has been a feature of the world economy 
for the past two centuries (see Figure 1, and Maddison, 1995 and 2001). Th   e only exception to this trend is 
the period 1965-1973, in which the international per capita GDP gap decreased slightly (as we will point out 
below, the mid-2000s may be the beginning of another phase of this type, but it is too soon to say whether 
this reﬂ  ects a longer-term trend). Th   e story of the developing countries is thus one of “divergence, big time” 
vis-à-vis the industrial world (Pritchett, 1997), with the late phase of the “golden age” the only exception 
so far in history. Th   is is also the conclusion of the analysis of the eﬀ  ects of inter-country inequality in world 
income distribution (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002); growing divergence among countries has also been 
a major contributor to the growing inequality of world income distribution over the past quarter century, if 
we isolate the eﬀ  ects of the rapid growth of China and, to a lesser extent, India (Berry and Serieux, 2004).
History has also shown considerable divergence among developing countries, particularly since the 
mid-1960s (Figure 1.C). Part of this divergence has been the result of several success stories (“miracles”) at 
diﬀ  erent times in various parts of the developing world (China and India being the most recent ones). Th  ere 
are, however, very few instances of “peripheral” countries that have joined the industrial “centre” (Japan being 
the notable exception in this regard, perhaps with some of the “ﬁ  rst-tier” Asian newly industrialized countries, 
or NICs). Th   is implies that “miracles” have been more commonly followed by either stagnation at middle- or 
even low-income levels (a phenomenon that can be called “truncated convergence”) or by outright collapses.
Th   is brief overview of historical trends helps to underscore the basic “stylized fact” about the post-
war development experience which serves as the starting point of this paper: unlike the “golden age” (1950-
1973) when there was fairly widespread growth in the developing world and, in its last phase (1965-1973), 
some convergence of the real incomes of developing countries vis-à-vis the industrial world, the period since 
1980 can be characterized as a “dual divergence”, involving both lower growth rates of developing vis-à-vis 
industrial countries, but also strikingly diﬀ  erent growth experiences among developing countries (Figure 1). 
Th   e intermediate period, covering the years between the two oil shocks of the 1970s, was a mixed story: still 
high average growth in the developing countries, but very high divergence among them.
5  Jones and Olken (2005) try to take this eﬀ  ect into account but do so using rather rough measures of labour force 
participation and electricity consumption. Th   eir results indicate that there is little change in labour force or capital 
utilization around either up-breaks or down-breaks. Contrary to this result, Ffrench-Davis (2005) shows that total 
factor productivity (TFP) estimates tend to be biased in a context of signiﬁ  cant changes in capacity utilization. He 
ﬁ  nds that, once this factor is taken into account, capital stock reappears as the main determinant of growth in most 
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Th   e story can best be told in terms of the frequency of episodes of sustained economic growth and 
collapses over time. In the 1960s and 1970s, about 40 per cent of developing countries could be consid-
ered success stories (annual average per-capita GDP growth greater than 3 per cent at least over a ﬁ  ve-year 
period), but this proportion fell to less than 20 per cent through most of the past quarter century (Figure 2). 
In contrast, less than 15 per cent of the countries had negative growth during the 1960s and 1970s, but that 
proportion increased to over 40 per cent in the 1980s and early 1990s. Collapses (deﬁ  ned in this graph as 
growth rates of -3 per cent per capita or less over at least a ﬁ  ve-year period) were rather nonexistent during 
the “golden age” but then shot up and became frequent during the “lost decade” of the 1980s (in several 
parts of the developing world and not only in Latin America) and in the early 1990s (when collapses were 
common in the former USSR, Central and Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa).
A similar story arises in Pritchett (2000), who catalogues countries according to the growth pattern fol-
lowed before or after a statistically determined structural break, which, on average, fell around 1977-78. Accord-
ing to this classiﬁ  cation, out of the 88 countries included in his analysis, 7 followed a steep hill;6 13 followed a 
hill pattern, with steady growth around 1.5 per cent, generally insuﬃ   cient for convergence with the industrial 
centre; and 7 accelerated7 after the break. Th   e majority of developing countries fall under the less appealing 
categories of growth followed by stagnation (12 plateaus), growth followed by contraction (32 mountains) and 
stagnation, or very slow growth in both periods (17 plains). Th   is means that, for more than half of developing 
countries, growth slowed down after the structural break, while very few experienced the opposite trend. 
Using a criterion of “success” similar to that used by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2004) to 
deﬁ  ne “sustained expansions” (four consecutive ﬁ  ve-year periods with growth over 2 per cent per capita8), we 
get again a similar picture: successful growth clustered in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 3a). Th  ose  experiences 
6  Fast growth, above 3 per cent per capita, before and after the break.
7  GDP growth below 1.5 per cent before the break, followed by growth above 1.5 per cent.
8  Four consecutive ﬁ  ve-year periods are equivalent to an eight-year period. For example, if the ﬁ  rst period is 1964-1968, 
for it to be considered a sustained expansion or contraction, the periods 1965-1969, 1966-1970 and 1967-1971 also 
have to be periods of 2 per cent average growth (expansion) or negative growth (contraction). 
Figure 2:
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
based on Maddison (2001).The Dual Divergence: Growth Success and Collapses ...  7
were widespread in the developing world during the “golden age”, tended to disappear in the 1980s, except 
in East Asia, and became somewhat more common in the 1990s, but at levels far below those of the “golden 
age”. A similar criterion to deﬁ  ne “sustained contractions” (four consecutive ﬁ  ve-year periods with negative 
GDP growth per capita9) indicates that they were rather infrequent before the ﬁ  rst oil shock, then tended to 
appear more frequently in Africa between the two oil shocks, to become widespread during the “lost decade” 
of the 1980s and the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s (Figure 3b).
Th   e cumulative eﬀ  ect of successes and collapses is summarized in Table 1. Between two-ﬁ  fths and 
one-half of developing countries experienced a fair rate of growth (25 per cent per capita over a decade) 
from the 1950s to the 1970s; this fell to less than one-ﬁ  fth during the “lost decade” and increased again in 
the 1990s, although at levels far below those of the “golden age”. Experiences of very rapid growth (over 50 
per cent in a decade) were quite common from the 1950s to the 1970s, yet very infrequent since. In turn, 
experiences of negative or highly negative growth were very infrequent in the 1950s and 1960s, started to 
become more common in the 1970s, shot up in the 1980s and were still very frequent in the 1990s. Seen as 
9  See footnote 8.
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Source: Authors’ calculations 
based on Maddison (2001).
Note: First, 5-year moving 
averages of per capita GDP 
growth rates were calculated. 
Th   en we counted the number of 
countries that experience a rate 
below 0 per cent and of those 
which experience a rate above 
2 per cent. Finally, we only 
consider the cases in which 4 
of those moving averages fulﬁ  ll 
consecutively those conditions.8  DESA Working Paper No. 24
a whole, therefore, the era of structural reforms in the developing world still has a long way to go to match 
the performance of the period of high State intervention in development. And the transition from one era to 
the next has already been registered in history as a long and costly one.
A clear way to summarize the evidence is that growth successes and collapses tend to cluster in speciﬁ  c 
time periods. It is unlikely that the domestic factors explored in the growth literature can explain such clus-
tering. Th   us, we have to rely on common external factors, as well as on domestic policies that transmit their 
eﬀ  ects in developing countries (particularly pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies that tend to reinforce, rather 
than smooth out, the domestic eﬀ  ects of external shocks; see Ocampo, 2005b). Th  e  outstanding  diﬀ  erence be-
tween “the dual divergence” and the “golden age” has been the signiﬁ  cant increase in the frequency of growth 
collapses and the much lower frequency of growth successes over the last quarter century (1980-2005). 
Th   e clustering of both successes and collapses implies that a global development cycle has dominated 
the medium-term trajectory followed by developing countries. Th   is cycle should be understood as the aver-
age growth performance of developing countries resulting from a set of external factors that aﬀ  ects all or 
large clusters of them, and thus constrains each country’s growth possibilities. While, historically, these fac-
tors have been associated with dynamic processes originating in the industrial world, they have also increas-
ingly encompassed the global eﬀ  ects of events originating in developing countries with systemic importance. 
Th   ese determinants of the cycle may have diverging eﬀ  ects on diﬀ  erent countries and regions. In this sense, 
the average growth trajectory is not inconsistent with variable performance within the developing world and, 
particularly, with strong regional dimensions.
Given the leading role played by the industrial world in determining the global development cycle, 
it is not surprising that the cycle coincides, to some extent, with the average growth performance of indus-
trial countries. Th   us, the end of the “golden age” in industrial countries also marked the end of the “golden 
age” of development. Nonetheless, other determinants of the cycle are more speciﬁ  c and relate to global trade 
trends (including those associated with commodity markets) and with boom-bust cycles in international 
ﬁ  nancing to developing countries. 
Th  e  global development cycle is depicted in Figure 4, in terms of the evolution of the weighted and 
un-weighted average per capita GDP growth of developing countries. Th   e oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 
disturbed the normal functioning of developed countries economies, generating inﬂ  ation and recession, and 
had important eﬀ  ects in developing countries as well (directly and through the recycling of petrodollars). 
Nonetheless, the dynamics of oil markets had diﬀ  erent eﬀ  ects on diﬀ  erent countries and thus cannot ex-
plain the general downturn observed by 1980. To explain that, we turn to two major and largely unexpected 
shocks that severely aﬀ  ected several parts of the developing world. 
Table 1.
Developing countries successes and collapses
(Percentage of total number of countries with cumulative per capita 
GDP growth rate – 101 countries, 1990 Geary-Kamin dollars, PPP)
1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
Cumulative growth X > 25% 42.6% 49.5% 45.5% 15.8% 30.7%
of which: X > 50% 12.9% 16.8% 17.8% 5.9% 5.0%
Cumulative growth X < 0% 5.9% 6.9% 26.7% 54.5% 30.7%
of which: X < -10% 1.0% 3.0% 15.8% 27.7% 18.8%
Source: Authors’ calculations 
based on Maddison (2001).The Dual Divergence: Growth Success and Collapses ...  9
Th  e  ﬁ  rst was the permanent eﬀ  ect of the interest rate shock of 1979 (Figure 5). Th   e second was the 
structural downward shift of the terms of trade (Figure 6). Th   e interest rate shock had no historical precedents. 
As inﬂ  ation promptly receded, real interest rates in the U.S. (using the 10-year Treasury note rate as a bench-
mark) increased from -1.8 per cent in 1979 to 3.6 per cent in 1981, reaching a peak of 8.2 per cent in 1984. 
Th   e rate faced by developing countries was even higher: the average risk premium paid by developing coun-
tries added to the LIBOR rate rose from 2.5 per cent in 1979 to 22 per cent in 1981 in real terms. Having 
proﬁ  ted from the recycling of petrodollars, developing countries suﬀ  ered a substantial shock that implied, 
for many of them, signiﬁ  cant balance of payments distress. Th   e non-oil commodity terms of trade shock did 
have precedents, but only in the distant past (in the 1920s). Real non-oil commodity prices experienced a 
structural downward shift of over 30 per cent, breaking the long stretch since the 1920s when they had been 
essentially trend-less (Ocampo and Parra, 2003). Th   e price index of manufactures exported by developing 
countries, relative to manufactures exported by developed countries, experienced a simultaneous downturn. 
Th   e unprecedented character of the interest rate shock and the distant memory of a comparable terms-of-
trade shock explain the unexpectedly large magnitude of ex-post risks that developing world had to confront. 
Th   e debt dynamics of developing countries turned explosive after the interest rate shock and had 
both short-term and long-term eﬀ  ects. Th   e proportion of developing countries with moderate debt ratios 
(over 50 per cent of GDP) had been rising from the mid-1970s but was still low prior to the shock, whereas 
the proportion with critical debt ratios (over 100 per cent of GDP) was very low (Figure 5). Both increased 
sharply after the interest rate shock and remained at high levels for the next quarter century, for three basic 
reasons. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is that real interest rates remained high: over 4.5 per cent for almost twenty years for that 
same U.S. interest rate; in fact, they only returned to low real levels in the early 2000s. Th   e second was the 
lack of international institutions to manage debt overhangs; this is in sharp contrast to the 1930s, when one 
such “institution” was available: broad based moratoria. Eventually a few solutions emerged, but had only 
weak eﬀ  ects: the Brady Plan of the late 1980s and the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative of 
the mid-1990s (still not fully implemented). Th   e third was that, together with the hike in interest rates, net 
ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows became negative. Th   us, net resource transfers remained highly negative until the early 1990s 
Figure 4:
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for a vast number of developing countries. Th   e Asian crisis, and its contagion eﬀ  ects, interrupted the recovery 
of the 1990s, although the crisis had weaker and more temporary eﬀ  ects than the debt crisis of the 1980s. 
Interestingly, the two factors that generated the “lost decade” may at long last be waning. Low real 
interest rates and the HIPC Initiative may ﬁ  nally break the long-term debt overhangs, while Chinese-led 
growth has strengthened commodity markets. Th   ese are some reasons why the global development cycle 
may be experiencing an upward shift (See Figure 4 above). It is still unclear, however, if these recent trends 
and their eﬀ  ects on the global development cycle will be sustainable, as the disturbance in global ﬁ  nancial 
markets associated with the correction of current global imbalances may lead to higher interest rates or risk 
Figure 5:
External debt sustainability and interest rates, 1970-2004
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Figure 6:
Primary commodities and developing 
countries terms of trade, 1900-2005
Commodities/manufactures price index
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premia, and commodity prices may have already reached a plateau (UN, 2006). To the extent that ODA to 
the poorest countries of the world increases, based on the commitments made in recent years, ODA may also 
become a positive determinant of the global development cycle.
Th   e central role played by the global development cycle does not render regional and country-
speciﬁ  c factors insigniﬁ  cant. Indeed, these factors play an important role, particularly in explaining why a 
country or region departs from the average trend in either phase of the cycle –i.e., why it does not experience 
rapid growth during periods of growth success in the developing world as a whole, or why it can mitigate 
or entirely avoid a growth collapse. Nonetheless, this is an entirely diﬀ  erent question than that raised in 
cross-country econometrics. Th   is means that the relevant country- and region- speciﬁ  c factors depend on 
those aﬀ  ecting the global development cycle and its domestic transmission mechanisms—and may thus be 
time-bound. It also implies that short-term dynamics, including the way macroeconomic policy is done, can 
play a more prominent role than the one usually attributed in the growth literature. It means, ﬁ  nally, that 
long-term determinants of growth—such as institutions, or the level of human capital—largely play a role to 
the extent that they help explain the capacity of individual countries to beneﬁ  t from upward phases and their 
vulnerability to external shocks during the downward phase of the global development cycle.
Th   is can be illustrated by the variable performance of diﬀ  erent developing countries during the “lost 
decade”, when, under similar adverse circumstances, some countries ended up in major crises, while others 
did not. Variance in performance among developing countries has been analyzed from two diﬀ  erent angles. 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst is through characteristics of the macroeconomic adjustment mechanism, and the second is through 
the institutional eﬀ  ects of the massive shocks coming from ﬁ  nancial and commodity markets. Th  e  literature 
that has analyzed diﬀ  erent adjustment mechanism has underscored the virtues of a broader set of macroeco-
nomic instruments, including mixing orthodox with less orthodox instruments (see, for example, Taylor, 
1988). Th   e degree of trade liberalization, as measured by the levels of tariﬀ   and non-tariﬀ   protection, did not 
play a role in the relative performance of diﬀ  erent countries during the 1980s (see, for example, UNCTAD, 
1992: Part II, Ch. I), but the degree of macroeconomic instability, deﬁ  ned in orthodox terms, did have sig-
niﬁ  cant eﬀ  ects. Th   is is, furthermore, the correct interpretation of the eﬀ  ects of several measures of “openness” 
used in cross-country econometrics, as emphasized by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). Th   e possibility and 
existence of national strategies to proﬁ  t from the growing markets in the industrial world for manufactures 
produced in developing countries did have importance as well (see the next section). But, as indicated in the 
voluminous literature on East Asian industrialization, the strategy followed by these countries has been quite 
diﬀ  erent from trade liberalization, in the traditional sense (see, for example, Amsden, 2001, and Wade 1990).
Th   e adverse eﬀ  ect of inﬂ  ation on growth has been used to show the incidence of macroeconomic in-
stability on the relative performance of diﬀ  erent countries. Seen in this light, however, inﬂ  ation is partly an ef-
fect of external shocks. Th   is is reﬂ  ected in the frequency of episodes of high inﬂ  ation in the developing world 
during the “lost decade”. Th   at frequency resulted mainly from the broad-based foreign exchange gaps that 
developing countries faced, which had direct and indirect impacts on domestic inﬂ  ation (via devaluation).
As Rodrik (1999) has argued, institutional factors, particularly institutions for managing conﬂ  ict, 
may help explain why, of countries facing the same adverse circumstances, only some ended up with this 
type of macroeconomic disequilibria. Th   is argument gives strong indirect backing to the old Latin Ameri-
can structuralist idea that distributive conﬂ  icts underlie inﬂ  ation. Other structural factors may have been at 
work, too. A typical debate in the Latin American literature of the 1980s focused on the “domestic transfer 
problem” (transferring resources to the government to service the foreign debt). Th   is transfer was made more 12  DESA Working Paper No. 24
diﬃ   cult in those countries in which the government did not have direct access to foreign exchange (i.e., did 
not directly or indirectly control the foreign exchange generated by exports), and thus had to guarantee ac-
cess to foreign exchange through indirect means (see, for example, ECLAC, 1996). Inﬂ  ationary crises were 
more common in countries where the internal transfer was more diﬃ   cult. 
Th   ese arguments indicate that external factors have a direct, as well as an indirect, eﬀ  ect on perfor-
mance in developing countries. Th   e indirect links are associated with the capacity of individual countries to 
manage vulnerability, but vulnerability would not have played an important role unless the countries faced 
an external shock. Th   us, the features of the relevant domestic factors are not independent of those of the 
external variables that determine the global developing cycle. Furthermore, the interaction between external 
and domestic factors may be contingent on the circumstances surrounding a speciﬁ  c period, and their joint 
eﬀ  ect may have long-term implications associated with path dependence. 
Th   e large and unexpected shocks that the developing world faced in the early 1980s provide the best 
explanation of the poor average performance of developing countries during the “lost decade”, while the 
relatively direct impact of the shocks, as well as the way economies adjusted to them, provide a ﬁ  rst explana-
tion of diverging performance among countries. A second explanation focuses on how domestic institutions 
or other domestic factors may have aﬀ  ected the domestic response to massive shocks. We will concentrate in 
the next section on a third factor, highlighted in much of the structuralist literature, yet generally ignored in 
mainstream growth analysis: the role of specialization patterns.
Patterns of specialization
As we have pointed out, the experience of developing countries indicates that growth takes place not in 
steady ﬂ  ows, but in spurts and collapses of diﬀ  erent magnitude and frequency. Th   e transformation of 
production structures and the role of specialization patterns are crucial in this context. In a broad sense, 
long-term growth can be understood as a sequence of sector-speciﬁ  c growth spurts, their intensity and the 
domestic linkages they generate (Ocampo, 2005a). Th   ese spurts are the result of innovations and the trans-
formation of production structures that they induce.
In developed countries, innovations are associated with technological waves—or, perhaps using 
Schumpeter’s (1961) terminology, diﬀ  erent forms of innovations or “new combinations”. In developing 
countries, innovations are more closely linked to the attraction of sectors, activities and technologies previ-
ously developed in the industrial world. Historically, this has involved processes of import substitution, 
export promotion or a mix of both strategies. In this context, although macroeconomic policy can certainly 
block or promote it, steady growth can be essentially seen as the result of a successful sequence of innova-
tions in production structures (i.e., of micro and, particularly, mesoeconomic processes). Th  ese  sectoral 
dynamics are ignored or assumed to play a passive role in growth analyses that concentrate on institutional 
or macroeconomic features and policies. In contrast, it plays a central role in the “structuralist” tradition of 
economic thinking, broadly deﬁ  ned, where growth is viewed as the result of success in managing the dynam-
ic transformation of production structures.
Seen in this light, the major issue over the past quarter century has been the rapid transformation of 
the structure of developing country exports: primary goods and natural-resource intensive manufactures fell 
relative to low-, mid- and high-technology manufactures (see Figure 7). All developing country regions di-
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(including into low-technology manufactures), followed by Latin America. Th   e success stories of the East 
Asian countries have been related to their achievements in entering external markets, proﬁ  ting from dynamic 
economies of scale and transforming their production structures accordingly.
Th   ree factors are important in understanding the links between the evolution of international trade 
over the past quarter century and the record of economic growth in the developing world. Th  e  ﬁ  rst is the 
rate of growth of global markets for developing countries’ exports. Dynamic markets for such exports can 
be generated by high income-elasticities of ﬁ  nal demand for them in the industrial world, by economies of 
diversiﬁ  cation (i.e., high and rising demand for diversity of designs), or by the transfer of activities to the de-
veloping world due to cost factors (particularly wage costs). Th   e second factor is the strong dynamic econo-
mies of scale that characterize sectors with large technological content. In this regard, it can be expected that 
specialization in sectors with greater technological content will lead to faster growth. Th  e  ﬁ  rst two factors are 
linked in practice, as higher technology products are the most dynamic in world trade (Lall, 2001; UNIDO, 
2002). Th   e third is the spatial agglomeration that may result from static or dynamic economies of scale. Th  is 
has long been a key issue in regional economics and has taken centre stage in the recent literature on eco-
nomic geography (see, for example, Fujita, Krugman and Venables, 1999). 
In the face of the diverse dynamics that characterize world markets, developing countries can adopt 
either of two broadly deﬁ  ned export strategies: increasing market shares in sectors where a speciﬁ  c country 
has an established position and diversifying into higher technology products. Th  e  ﬁ  rst strategy is widely 
available; the second may only be available to a limited number of developing countries. Th   is is particularly 
true for high technology exports, where opportunities may be subject to agglomeration eﬀ  ects. Opportuni-
ties for producing primary goods and natural resource-intensive manufactures are more broadly available, 
but the dynamism of international markets is limited and can therefore lead to “fallacy of composition” ef-
fects. Consequently, the simultaneous entry of several countries into these markets will lead to an oversupply 
of exports that will be reﬂ  ected in falling terms of trade for developing countries as a whole and/or to high-
cost producers being displaced from the market. Low-tech manufactures fall in between these two cases.
Figure 7:
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Individual countries can succeed with any of these strategies, especially if they implement appropri-
ate productive strategies (see, for example, the success of Chile with the ﬁ  rst, or that of the Republic of Korea 
with the second). However, as a group, developing countries can only succeed, in any market, if ﬁ  nal demand 
is elastic and/or if developed countries lose market shares—provided of course that the process is not ham-
pered by protectionism in the developed countries.
Th   e existing literature has explored these issues in diﬀ  erent ways. Lall (2001) argues that export 
structures, being path-dependent, have important implications for growth and development, with highest 
technology products having the greatest beneﬁ  ts in terms of learning and spill-over eﬀ  ects, as well as being 
more dynamic in world trade. Palma (2004) expresses a similar view based on the diﬀ  erent capacity that low- 
vs. high-technology products have in inducing medium- and long-term productivity growth in the economy 
as a whole, as well as their relative dynamism in world trade. Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) have 
argued, in turn, that the quality of exports, as indicated in the “income level” of a country’s exports (i.e., 
an estimate of the weighted average income of countries exporting speciﬁ  c products, which may be seen to 
reﬂ  ect their technological content), is an independent determinant of economic growth. 
Th   ese relations have been used to explain East Asia’s much superior growth performance. According 
to Lall (2001) and Palma (2004), among others, that performance is closely associated with the continuous 
eﬀ  ort, both by the State and the corporate sector, to upgrade export production capacities. UNCTAD (2003) 
provides a detailed analysis of the signiﬁ  cant divergence in the growth of developing countries along these 
lines. Th   e East Asian economies have experienced persistent industrialization drives. In contrast, in Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, the share of manufacturing in GDP fell in the 1980s and stabilized in the 1990s at relatively 
low levels. South America has experienced premature deindustrialization, while Mexico and Central America 
avoided this trend by specializing in high-import intensive manufacturing exports, but with limited beneﬁ  ts 
in terms of growth (see also, in this regard, ECLAC, 2004; Ocampo and Martin, 2004; Palma, 2005). 
Some of the transformation processes involved have links to the external shocks experienced by 
developing countries—i.e., to the dynamics of the global development cycle. Th   us, UNCTAD (2003) argues 
that the impact of integration into the world economy largely depends on the circumstances under which it 
takes place and on the policies pursued during the integration phase. Integration of Latin America and Africa 
(as well as Central and Eastern Europe) marked a sharp shift in development strategy, occurring in a “big-
bang” manner and following the debt crisis (i.e., a period of weakness). Th   is contrasts with the integration 
process in East Asia, which occurred from a position of strength and was characterized by a continuous and 
purposeful strategy of gradual opening up. Expressing it in the Schumpeterian terminology used by Ocampo 
(2005a), in East Asia, the “creative” elements prevailed (“creative destruction”), while in other regions of 
the world, the “destructive” components of the restructuring process were stronger (“destructive creation”), 
reﬂ  ecting the destruction of many import-substitution activities and the weak domestic linkages generated 
by new export sectors. 
Th   e development impact of the strategy of a given country would depend not only on success in 
entering markets, but also on the capacity to capture a share of the value added in the production chain. 
Th   is is, in a sense, obvious and even tautological, for GDP is nothing else but “value added”, but it can 
have broader implications, as those activities with limited value added (e.g., maquila) are also likely to be 
footloose. In the terms used by Palma (2004), unless the industries are ﬁ  rmly “anchored” in the domestic 
economy, their growth-enhancing capacity evaporates. Ocampo (2005a) refers to these specialization pat-
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According to UNIDO (2002), middle- and high-tech products represent more than 60 per cent 
of world total manufacturing exports, mainly due to the dynamic growth of high-tech exports. Th  is  comes 
intertwined with the growth of the integrated production systems of multinational ﬁ  rms, which have located 
diﬀ  erent parts of the production chains in diﬀ  erent locations and countries (UNCTAD, 2002). Moreover, 
although the direct and indirect import content of the manufactured exports of developing countries are 
generally high, and have been rising in recent years, the capacity to capture certain activities (such as assem-
bly tasks) may not lead to rapid growth (UNCTAD, 2002). Th   is is also linked to the relationship the coun-
try establishes with FDI: if the strategy to attract FDI is focused, not on creating assets (by providing human 
resources and infrastructure), but on oﬀ  ering special incentives to multinational investments, the process can 
ultimately be counterproductive (Mortimore and Peres, 2001).
According to Mayer, Butkevicius and Kadri (2002), becoming part of an international production 
network broadens the range of sectors on which developing countries can base their quest for industrializa-
tion. Given relative factor endowments, developing countries may begin by acquiring competence for the 
more labour-intensive components of complex products and gradually move to more skill- and technol-
ogy-intensive activities. Nonetheless, due to the geographically dispersed production sites, the package of 
technology and skills available at any one site is narrower, and, more generally, the spill-overs from subcon-
tracting or hosting aﬃ   liates of multinational enterprises are reduced. As a result, cross-border backward and 
forward linkages are strengthened at the expense of domestic ones.
Mayer (2003) reviews the literature on the “fallacy of composition” with an emphasis on labour-
intensive manufactures. Th   e analysis indicates a potential problem in this market, as competition among 
diﬀ  erent developing countries for export shares may reduce the beneﬁ  ts from manufacturing exports. Th  e 
likelihood that a country which exports labour-intensive manufactures would be subject to adverse price 
trends and protectionism in the North has risen with the increasing integration of several highly populated 
low-income countries into world markets. According to this author, experience in this regard diﬀ  ers across 
diﬀ  erent groups of countries. Th   e group of countries with the lowest proportion of skill- and technology-in-
tensive manufactures and the greatest proportion of labour-intensive products in their manufactured exports 
has faced declining terms of trade for its manufacturing exports. Others appear to have succeeded in improv-
ing their terms of trade vis-à-vis other developing countries by shifting their exports into higher skill- and 
technology-intensive manufactures. UNCTAD (2002) also shows that there are signs that the prices of the 
manufactured exports of developing countries have been weakening in the last 20 years vis-à-vis those of 
industrial countries, especially for the less skill-intensive manufactured exports (see Figure 6). 
“Fallacy of composition” eﬀ  ects are even more important in primary goods, most of which face low 
income-elasticities of demand in world markets. Indeed, the downward structural shift of non-oil commod-
ity prices in the 1980s may be viewed as the result of the massive export supply generated by developing 
countries trying to adjust to the debt crises (see Figure 6). A similar phenomenon may have aﬀ  ected manu-
factures exported by developing countries to the industrial world. According to this analysis, the deteriora-
tion of the terms of trade can be better explained by diﬀ  erences among countries (developed versus develop-
ing countries, diﬀ  erent levels of technological capacity, diﬀ  erent organization of labour markets, presence 
or absence of surplus labour, diﬀ  erent position in international debt and trade markets, etc), rather than by 
the characteristics of the goods they export. In other words, the manufactures exported by a large number of 
developing countries –i.e. labour-intensive manufactures– share some of the disadvantages originally high-
lighted by the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis in relation to commodity markets (see Ocampo and Parra, 2006, 
who also survey the relevant literature).16  DESA Working Paper No. 24
Th   e terms-of-trade debate has essentially been one about whether developing countries need to in-
dustrialize or not. As Sarkar (2001) stated, the policy implication of the classical hypothesis on the evolution 
of commodity prices10 was that an agricultural country did not need to industrialize to enjoy the gains from 
technical progress taking place in manufactures; free play of international market forces would distribute the 
gains from the industrial countries to the agricultural countries through favourable terms of trade. Prebisch 
(1950) argued that the asymmetries between the centre and the periphery of the world economy destroyed 
the basic premise of the international division of labour, making the transmission of technical change in the 
world economy highly uneven. Th   us, for developing countries, industrialization was not an end in itself, but 
the principal means at the disposal of the countries for obtaining a share of the beneﬁ  ts of technical progress 
and for progressively raising the standard of living of their population.
Th   is has generated another debate in which the point of contention is whether there are “commod-
ity-like” characteristics in manufacturing processes in developing countries that place these countries in 
double jeopardy in their attempts to escape from unequal exchange in world trade. Th   is debate has generated 
what Athukorala (2000) calls the “new terms of trade pessimism”, in the sense that it could be self defeat-
ing for developing countries to try to industrialize. But several individual case studies for Asia show that this 
is not necessarily true. Some countries have in fact achieved signiﬁ  cant terms of trade gains. Could other 
developing countries also avoid this “curse”? Th   ere are, indeed, grounds for optimism, but only in so far as 
developing countries take a more pro-active attitude towards promoting technological improvements, indus-
trialization and export diversiﬁ  cation. 
Th   e simple correlation between specialization patterns and growth presented in Figure 8 provides a 
ﬁ  rst look at the relevance of the previous arguments. Economic growth in the developing world is negatively 
correlated with continued reliance on the exports of primary goods and natural resource-intensive manufac-
tures, but positively correlated with diversifying into mid- and high-tech manufactures, with no clear pattern 
when we look at low-tech manufactures. Th   ere are, however, signiﬁ  cant diﬀ  erences in performance around 
the average pattern.
A closer look at this issue shows the interaction between two diﬀ  erent variables: success in increas-
ing market shares and specialization patterns. Tables 2 and 3 provide a detailed look at the evidence on 
the interaction between these two factors. Th  e  ﬁ  rst shows countries that have continued to rely on natural 
resource based manufactures or primary commodities, while the second looks at countries able to increase 
market shares in non-natural resource based manufacturing categories. In both cases, we restrict the analysis 
to sectors that represent at least 20 per cent of the exports of a country in 2002.
Th   e evidence presented by these two tables is striking and can be summarized in four major conclu-
sions.11 First, most countries that have failed to increase shares in world markets are exporters of primary 
goods or natural resource-intensive manufactures, and all of them experienced either low growth or per-capita 
GDP contraction. Second, success in increasing market shares in these sectors has been generally associated 
with weak growth. Indeed, Chile, Seychelles, Oman, Uganda and Egypt are the only cases in the sample of 96 
countries analyzed that extracted GDP per capita growth above 2 per cent during 1980-2002 from a strategy 
based on natural resources (Table 2). Other countries that had rapid rates of growth mixed this strategy with 
10  We refer here to the belief, dating back to Adam Smith, that the terms of trade of primary products would show long-
term improvement vis-à-vis manufactures, based on the law of diminishing returns in primary production and the law 
of increasing returns in manufactures.
11 Th   e analysis is based on the structure of exports of goods. Th   erefore, it does not include diversiﬁ  cation into services, 
which may be behind some of the rapid success stories.The Dual Divergence: Growth Success and Collapses ...  1 7
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Chile 152 2 9 51.6% 6.8% 39.1% 5.4% 2.86%
Seychelles 690 1 1 20.2% 1.8% 73.2% 29.8% 2.44%
Oman 512 3 13 86.0% 9.6% 2.26%
Uganda 800 1 1 83.9% 0.3% 2.16%
Sudan 736 1 3 31.7% 0.7% 65.3% 11.7% 1.81%
Chad 148 1 2 92.2% 5.5% 1.78%
United Republic of Tanzania 834 1 1 66.5% 1.0% 26.6% 1.5% 1.21%
Burkina Faso 854 1 5 79.4% 2.4% 1.20%
Benin 204 1 5 82.2% 8.3% 1.13%
Panama 591 2 8 66.7% 7.1% 1.07%
Colombia 170 2 9 52.1% 3.4% 0.96%
Mali 466 1 5 81.3% 5.5% 0.88%
Mozambique 508 1 1 86.8% 6.5% 0.74%
Jamaica 388 2 7 83.1% 0.3% 0.64%
Senegal 686 1 5 58.9% 3.4% 0.64%
Guinea 324 1 5 90.6% 0.5% 0.49%
Mauritania 478 1 5 50.3% 3.8% 46.4% 3.6% 0.42%
Iran, Islamic Republic of 364 3 11 89.7% 9.3% 0.37%
Brazil 76 2 9 28.6% 6.1% 30.1% 4.7% 0.36%
Syrian Arab Republic 760 3 13 83.9% 5.3% 0.30%
Ecuador 218 2 9 76.0% 2.8% 0.15%
Guinea-Bissau 624 1 5 95.7% 7.9% 0.05%
Malawi 454 1 1 77.8% 1.8% -0.13%
Congo 178 1 2 79.4% 1.9% -0.14%
Paraguay 600 2 9 68.7% 4.8% -0.50%
Peru 604 2 9 48.6% 2.1% 33.8% 3.5% -0.54%
Angola 24 1 2 89.3% 5.4% -0.56%
Bahrain 48 3 13 73.3% 3.8% -0.62%
Argentina 32 2 9 50.3% 4.4% 27.3% 5.9% -0.72%
Cameroon 120 1 2 75.5% 1.0% 21.3% 3.0% -0.77%
Zimbabwe 716 1 1 41.8% 0.0% 27.1% 6.3% -0.96%
Gabon 266 1 2 82.1% 0.7% -1.38%
Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep. Of 862 2 9 83.1% 3.9% -1.43%
Nicaragua 558 2 8 62.1% 1.1% 22.5% 3.4% -1.65%
Comoros 174 1 1 92.2% 1.6% -1.72%
Somalia 706 1 1 58.4% 2.9% 35.1% 4.1% -2.25%
United Arab Emirates 784 3 13 62.9% 3.5% -3.30% 0.20%
Egypt 818 1 3 28.5% -0.6% 41.6% 5.9% 2.41%
Cuba 192 2 7 85.0% -4.8% 0.70%
Ghana 288 1 5 54.4% -0.4% 37.2% 1.2% 0.47%
Gambia 270 1 5 76.4% -4.1% 0.08%
Algeria 12 1 3 83.3% -0.6% -0.04%
Guatemala 320 2 8 45.6% -1.0% 26.9% 5.1% -0.16%
Kenya 404 1 1 36.7% -1.1% 47.3% 0.1% -0.21%
Rwanda 646 1 1 61.6% -4.9% 35.7% -1.5% -0.22%
Bolivia 68 2 9 54.9% 1.4% 30.7% -1.1% -0.24%
Nigeria 566 1 5 99.8% -0.4% -0.28%
Côte d'Ivoire 384 1 5 59.4% 3.4% 22.3% -0.8% -0.45%
Burundi 108 1 1 79.8% -4.2% -0.61%
Central African Republic 140 1 2 86.8% -1.3% -1.09%
Togo 768 1 5 46.6% -2.7% 38.4% -0.6% -1.52%
Zambia 894 1 1 63.1% -2.7% 21.8% -0.9% -1.73%
Niger 562 1 5 32.3% -0.1% 59.5% -6.4% -1.87%
Djibouti 262 1 1 34.4% -1.4% 39.4% 0.7% -1.87%
Sao Tome and Principe 678 1 2 96.2% -5.6% -1.92%
Kuwait 414 3 13 62.3% 1.0% 32.7% -1.2% -2.38%
Sierra Leone 694 1 5 91.1% -5.7% -2.68%
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 434 1 3 81.5% -1.4% -3.38%
South Arabia 682 3 13 87.0% -3.0% -5.06% -1.00%
GDP growth  High-tech 
manufactures
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low-tech manufactures (Vietnam, Mauritius, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Myanmar) or high-tech manu-
factures (Costa Rica, which had, in any case, a much lower rate of growth). Th   ird, there are cases of countries 
(Cape Verde, Dominican Republic, Nepal and Tunisia) that have extracted rapid growth from a specialization 
pattern based on low-tech manufactures or, as previously mentioned, by mixing it with natural resource inten-
sive goods, but most developing countries that have grown fast have been increasing market shares in mid- or 
high-technology exports (Table 3). Finally, there is, in any case, a signiﬁ  cant diﬀ  erence in the capacity of Asian 
countries to extract growth out of these sectors vis-à-vis Latin American (Costa Rica and Mexico), Central 
European (Hungary and Poland) and West Asian (Turkey) countries. Th   is may be related to the “destructive” 
features of productive restructuring underway outside Asia, but also to the stronger linkages associated with 
new technology exports in Asia, which are in some cases national, but more generally regional in character.
Figure 9 summarizes in a simple way the evidence provided in Tables 2 and 3. Panel A shows the 
very large diﬀ  erence in average growth rates between countries undergoing a transformation of specializa-
tion patterns into higher technology exports vs. those specializing in natural resource-intensive sectors, even 
when they increased market shares in those sectors. Th   ose gaining market share in low-tech manufactures 
fall in between. Panel B shows that countries that still based their exports mainly on primary commodities 
Table 3.
Share of exports by technological content and economic growth in countries 



































































China 156 3 10 39.0% 14.1% 27.4% 25.1% 8.20%
Republic of Korea 410 3 10 30.9% 10.7% 38.4% 17.0% 6.09%
Thailand 764 3 12 20.4% 14.1% 31.4% 31.5% 4.50%
Singapore 702 3 12 58.6% 15.9% 4.11%
Hong Kong SAR, China 344 3 10 37.2% 9.4% 20.6% 10.5% 35.2% 17.3% 3.54%
Malaysia 458 3 12 52.7% 18.0% 3.44%
Turkey 792 3 13 49.6% 15.5% 20.7% 18.5% 2.00%
Israel 376 3 13 45.3% 10.3% 26.6% 14.5% 1.64%
Hungary 348 4 14 33.3% 22.2% 31.5% 17.2% 1.55%
Poland 616 4 14 30.6% 6.6% 30.4% 3.8% 1.24%
Costa Rica 188 2 8 26.6% 2.6% 26.7% 22.4% 1.04%
Czech Republic 200 4 14 20.4% 4.0% 26.0% 2.9% 27.7% 4.3% 21.9% 10.5% 0.94%
Mexico 484 2 8 26.6% 12.1% 33.1% 15.3% 0.52%
Trinidad and Tabago 780 2 7 20.6% -3.3% 46.6% -1.1% 25.2% 14.3% 0.44%
Philippines 608 3 12 70.6% 29.5% 0.22%
Romania 642 4 14 48.0% 2.9% 21.5% 0.4% -0.12% 2.5%
Viet Nam 704 3 12 50.4% 18.3% 31.9% 20.7% 4.59%
Mauritius 480 1 1 24.6% 1.5% 62.9% 11.9% 4.47%
India 356 3 11 32.1% 11.6% 36.2% 9.4% 3.58%
Indonesia 360 3 12 31.9% 0.1% 24.6% 5.9% 20.6% 21.5% 3.34%
Cape Verde 132 1 5 93.1% 25.7% 3.23%
Sri Lanka 144 3 11 22.8% 2.2% 59.1% 15.3% 3.18%
Myanmar 104 3 12 53.0% 10.2% 27.9% 28.0% 2.71%
Dominican Republic 214 2 7 61.4% 4.1% 2.45%
Nepal 524 3 11 74.0% 11.2% 2.25%
Tunisia 788 1 3 53.2% 10.0% 2.16%
Bangladesh 50 3 11 88.8% 10.2% 1.97%
Pakistan 586 3 11 76.0% 8.3% 1.89%
Morocco 504 1 3 22.6% 1.2% 20.1% 3.6% 38.5% 11.5% 1.15%
Albania 8 4 16 80.8% 8.7% 1.07%
El Salvador 222 2 8 28.3% 10.8% 34.2% 5.0% 0.69%
Mongolia 496 3 10 26.6% -4.7% 37.9% 12.0% 34.5% 4.1% 0.61%
Uruguay 858 2 9 41.5% 3.4% 22.3% 5.2% 29.2% 0.6% 0.21%
Honduras 340 2 8 31.2% -0.1% 43.6% 5.5% 20.2% 8.1% -0.16%
Jordan 400 3 13 24.7% 5.2% 29.3% 10.2% -0.68%
Madagascar 450 1 1 55.2% -3.1% 32.8% 10.6% -2.08%
Haití 332 2 7 85.3% 4.1% -2.42% 1.6%
GDP growth  High-tech 
manufactures















































































































Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD Handbook of International Statistics Online and UN data.20  DESA Working Paper No. 24
and natural resource based manufactures in 2002 did not grow in the previous two decades. Countries that 
grew the most had specialized in two (out of three) non-natural resource based manufacturing categories or 
only in high-tech manufactures. Mixes involving natural resource exports with non-natural resource inten-
sive manufactures, as well as specialization in low-tech manufactures, fall in between. Th   is indicates that 
specialization patterns, and their evolution over time, do matter. Indeed, few factors among those explored in 
standard growth regressions can explain diﬀ  erences as large as those captured in Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 9, 
which are in the order of 3 percentage points per year. 
Although the conclusions are not necessarily very encouraging for all developing countries, they in-
dicate that any country wanting to speed up growth should learn from the NIEs’ State and corporate eﬀ  orts 
to consistently upgrade export production capacities. Although diversifying into mid- and high-technology 
exports is not feasible for many developing countries, and there may be agglomeration forces at work that 
beneﬁ  t the already dynamic East Asian regional cluster, there could be opportunities for some of them that 
should not be disregarded. 


































































Specialization vs. Growth: 1980-2002

























































Source: Tables 2 and 3.The Dual Divergence: Growth Success and Collapses ...  2 1
Most developing countries would have to compete in primary goods, natural resource or low-tech 
manufacturing exports, where they may face “fallacy of composition” eﬀ  ects. Th   e medium-term option is 
clearly to promote the continued opening of markets for these products by industrial countries. In the long 
term, countries should not hesitate to enter the export learning process, always having in mind the objec-
tive of upgrading export capabilities and avoiding stagnation around primary commodities and perhaps even 
labour-intensive manufactures. 
Conclusions 
Th   is paper analyzes major factors explaining the transition from the “golden age” of fairly widespread growth 
in the developing world in 1950-1973 to the “dual divergence” since 1980, involving both lower growth 
rates of developing vis-à-vis developed countries and strikingly diﬀ  erent growth experiences among develop-
ing countries. It builds from a growing body of literature emphasizing discontinuities in the growth experi-
ence of developing countries—growth spurts and collapses—that render traditional cross-country economet-
rics involving long time periods a rather useless analytical tool. Th   e paper builds also on issues traditionally 
emphasized by the structuralist literature, yet frequently ignored by mainstream development economists.
A clear way to summarize the evidence is that growth successes and collapses tend to cluster in speciﬁ  c 
time periods. It is unlikely that the domestic factors explored in the mainstream growth literature can explain 
such clustering; so, we have to rely on common external factors. Th  e  signiﬁ  cant increase in the frequency of 
collapses and the much lower frequency of successes in the last quarter century (1980-2005) is the signiﬁ  cant 
diﬀ  erence between the period of the “dual divergence” and the “golden age”. Th   e clustering of successes and 
collapses implies that a global development cycle has dominated development trends. Th   e global development 
cycle is partly determined by that of the industrial world countries. Th   us, the end of the “golden age” in 
industrial countries also marked the end of the “golden age” of development. However, other determinants 
of this cycle are more speciﬁ  c, and have to do with the functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets vis-à-vis developing 
countries (and, more particularly, emerging markets) and with the major structural downturn experienced by 
the terms of trade in the 1980s. 
Of course, country speciﬁ  c factors still play a role, explaining why a country does not experience 
rapid growth during periods of growth success in the developing world as a whole, or why it can better man-
age vulnerabilities during downswings of the global development cycle. And domestic policies, particularly 
pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies, are crucial for transmitting the eﬀ  ects of external shocks. Nonetheless, 
the relevant domestic factors are not independent of the external factors that determine the global develop-
ment cycle. Furthermore, this interaction between external and domestic factors may be contingent on the 
circumstances surrounding a speciﬁ  c period.
Discontinuities in the growth experience are important, due to the path dependence generated by 
dynamic economies of scale, which reﬂ  ect the links between technological learning and production experi-
ence. An additional issue, not explored in this paper, is associated with the eﬀ  ects of shocks and major insti-
tutional changes on State institution-building, due to the complex “learning” process involved.
Discontinuities are also important for development in the sense that long-term growth should be 
understood as the result of a sequence of sector-speciﬁ  c growth spurts, their intensity and the domestic link-
ages they generate. Th   is implies that specialization patterns are crucial to understand growth dynamics. Overall, 22  DESA Working Paper No. 24
the evidence presented in this paper underscores the very large diﬀ  erence between the average growth of 
countries undergoing a transformation of specialization patterns into higher technology exports and that of 
countries experiencing success in primary goods sectors. 
Th   is conclusion is not necessarily very encouraging for developing countries as a whole, for the 
opportunity to diversify into medium- and high-technology exports may not be available to many of them, 
given the agglomeration forces at work. In any case, more developing countries should learn from the NIEs’ 
substantive State and corporate sector eﬀ  orts to consistently upgrade export production capacities. 
Most developing countries would have to compete in primary goods, natural resource or low-tech 
manufacturing exports, where they are likely to face “fallacy of composition” eﬀ  ects. Th   e medium-term op-
tion is clearly to promote the continued opening of markets for these products by industrial countries. In the 
long term, countries should be aware of the risk of fallacy of composition, yet simultaneously promote a pro-
cess of export diversiﬁ  cation that creates dynamic comparative advantages and “climbs the ladder” towards 
more technologically advanced products. 
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